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Abstract 
The present work has a central question: how a certain media distinguishes itself 
from the other communicational and linguistic apparatuses of the world. And with that, he 
turns on the big question of what each media practice would be. The hypothesis defended 
here is that each type of media, in its definition, is a language and not an apparatus. Using 
the concepts of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard and John R. 
Searle, the concepts of parergon and ergon are discussed. Thus, there is the consideration 
that if the study of the parergon is a logical study, close to the philosophical debates of the 
Analytical Philosophy and of authors of Continental Philosophy that quoted Wittgenstein, 
the study of ergon is a pragmatic study, focused on the speech acts. Logic and Pragmatics 
do not enter here as competitors, but rather as analytical partners in the definition and study 
of a language. While the first one analyzes the clipping modes, the second analyzes the 
action made possible by its clipping. 
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The present work has a central question: how a certain media distinguishes itself 
from the other communicational and linguistic apparatuses of the world. And with that, he 
turns on the big question of what each media practice would be. The hypothesis defended 
here is that each type of media, in its definition, is a language and not an apparatus.  
Now, by checking the media practices in absence - that is, by imitating them 
outside of their vehicle - we can observe the autonomy of the media languages in relation 
to the apparatus that, in the limit, is what provides its language status. What moves the 
media practice are not mechanisms of mechanical transmission and reception, but rather 
their character of language, their possibilities of “clipping” of the world provided by the 
concatenation and the specification. 
Clearly, any media language allows a clipping of the world even because, given its 
linguistic ability, it is cut in two ways: (1) it provides an order of things; And (2) it is cut 
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off from the world, that is, from other communicational or linguistic devices. These two 
ways are the two faces of the same cutout, being inseparable. Its conditions of existence 
and representation consist of this linguistic mechanism. 
Such a consideration points to the position of this work within the Analytic 
Philosophy of Language, more specifically in Wittgensteinian thought and its conception 
of the nature of language as representation. Here is the order of the grammarian, of the 
logic of the language games to which we are subjected. 
Thus it is erroneous to think that, for example, imagination delimits the frontiers of 
meaning, and may even expand it. In fact, the imaginability is among the logical criteria 
already put. Such a grammar is not a 'big mirror'. It does not reflect the essence of things. 
On the contrary, it is autonomous. It determines the essence of things (BAKER & 
HACKER, 2005, p.19). But we can not believe, as §398 of Philosophical Investigations 
puts it, that this grammar is just another form of Vorstellungwelt. 
What is important to note here is that we are placed in language, immersed in their 
games and that everything, in fact, is representation not only because of their lack of 
autonomy, but because everything is utterances of the logic of the world. We do not own 
the visual room, nor the Vorstellungwelt, we are part of it. And this is no different with the 
media. 
Thus, the stance of this essay is to treat the media as a language game, and it is 
possible to draw a grammar. It is through this Media Grammar that we can characterize the 
media as a language. This Grammar, based on the concept of Wittgenstein, is composed of 
a dimension of writing - to use the term deconstructionist - that makes it combine two of 
the three linguistic sectors of the media, represented by the schematic below: 
 
parergon ergon multiple 
• Language games 
(Wittgenstein) 
• Difference (Derrida) or 
Differend (Lyotard) 
• Technical reproducibility 
• Logical rules 
(Wittgenstein) 
• Speech acts (Searle), 
language betting (Lyotard) 
• Linguistic materiality 
• Language standards 
(Wittgenstein) 
• Performative strategies 
(Austin, Searle) 
• Phenomenon 
• The media (what unites 
them) 
• The media program model 
(what distinguishes them) 
• The media program itself 
(which manifests itself) 
Media Grammar  
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Here, there is a prominent use of the terms parergon and ergon, taken from the 
derridarian paraesthesia. The concept of parergon is highlighted in Aesthetics with the 
Critique of Judgment. Kant (2005, p. 45) finds that ornaments (parerga), such as the frames 
of a painting, although not part of the artistic representation and even undermine the 
genuine beauty, are essential for a broadening and recognition Of aesthetic taste. 
This consideration of Kant - which could even go unnoticed - is taken up by 
Jacques Derrida in his studies of Aesthetics. In them, Derrida indicates that the parergon of 
a work of art indicates a need, a lack, that it has in its representational process. What 
constitutes the parerga, in Derrida's (1987, 59-60) reasoning, "is not only its exteriority as 
an addition, but rather the internal structural connection that fixes it to the inner fault of the 
work (ergon). And this lack is constitutive of the ergon unit itself. Without this lack, the 
ergon would not need parergon. Lack of ergon is the lack of a paregon ". 
In this way, these ornaments - such as the frame for a painting or a column for a 
bust - are what make the work of art to be recognized as such. It is the last frontier between 
what is and what is not. However, the analysis of the parergon only by the letter of Derrida 
is insufficient to analyze our work within a posture derived from the Analytic Philosophy 
of Language. What we have with Derrida can be summarized in the following terms: (1) 
Parergon is a place of (re)presentation, that is, it is through him that we recognize a 
practice as such. This (re)presentation operates through a cut, a distinction between the 
work of art and the rest of the world; (2) Parergon is a "function of function". The 
definition of the work of art provided by the parergon is not the demonstration of an origin 
(as the tradition represented by Heidegger demonstrates) or of a structure. It is locked in a 
function. The parergon is nothing more than a function that defines this function; (3) 
Parergon makes it possible to work in the frame. Using Mallarme's reflection, Derrida 
demonstrated the possibilities of imitation. Imitation and definition of a work of art are 
closely linked; And (4) Parergon indicates a logic that relates it to ergon. Derrida calls this 
situation a "framed violence." 
In analyzing the question of the Aesthetics of philosophy from Hegel to the 
Antiessentialists, the analytical theorists of art, we find nine other interesting points: (1) 
The Hegelian idea of a formal game, root of understanding of the work of art; (2) The 
presence of an agonism of language, a strife in the definition of the work of art as 
demonstrated by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; (3) The importance of the combinatorial, 
described by Deleuze, for the definition of the games that cut the (re) presentation. The 
influence of the Leibnizian idea of a chess at the heart of any representation; (4) Deleuzian 
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investigation of language through rules of a play of meanings and meanings; (5) The 
question of an absence of creation in art. Artistic field as a field of potentialities and 
combinations as demonstrated by the Kandinsky / Duchamp debate; (6) The definition of 
what is art or not through the question of an Algebra of function as Duchamp shows in the 
question of the readymade; (7) The absence of essence in the cut of art before the things of 
the world as described by the anti-essentialists; (8) The analogy between art and games in 
the question of their rules. This analogy made by the anti-essentialists, based on the 
reflection made by the Philosophical Investigations of Wittgenstein; And (9) Finally, the 
definition of the rules of what an art is or not, through the Wittgensteinian concept of 
Familienähnlichkeit, as the anti-essentialists preach. 
These nine considerations combined with the four derridarian ones, actualize the 
concept of parergon in the measure that they give to this condition of clipping a linguistic 
character. That is, not only can it serve questions of language practices, but in the very 
concept lies a mechanism with such properties. 
We thus see that parergon is in reality the locus of a logical cut, which can be seen 
through mechanisms of language such as combinatorial. In fact, we have come to see that 
the parergon can be seen as the locus of the language game. It is through a language game 
that the definition of a particular practice operates. That is, the analysis of the mediatic 
parergon is an analysis of the game of mediatic language. What makes the media cut from 
other world practices is its language play, the engendering of rules that relate to each other 
through similarities. 
Ergon, in the theoretical dimension posed by the present work, is linked to the idea 
of the difference. Now, ergon, as we have seen previously, can not be considered as the 
work itself, but as a model of work. This work model is defined by the difference, the 
Lyotardian concept, defined as a strategy to play the language game. For Lyotard, in his 
work Le Differend, what would be the bet, the outcome of the dispute? 
In this view, the actors of an artistic and / or mediatic practice (or any other (re) 
presentational activity) do not make the rules of the games, they can only act on them. And 
such action is playing in the form of betting, just as in a card game where playing and 
betting are interconnected. "When Cézanne uses his brush, what is bet on the painting is 
called into question; When Schönberg sits on his piano, it's what's in play in music; When 
Joyce picks up his pen, that's what's in the literature" (LD, §192). In this way, even the 
most radical movements in the artistic fields are strategies to play within them. There is no 
creation, only dispute without consensus, fruit of the agonism of language. 
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What are formed here are what Lyotard calls the genres of discourse, as can be seen 
in the citation of §188 of Le Differend. Each style school is a discourse genre, a strategy of 
trying to play well (or play poorly) the language game. 
Thus the media has a language game, but the mediatic doing is a difference. Media 
programs alone are multiples. These multiples, mere objects, are the products of media 
grammar, which in turn, is the broad interactional scope between language games and 
differences, between rules and ways of playing (of betting, of making their bid). 
To analyze the differences, it is necessary to go to the Theory of Speech Acts, part 
of the Pragmatics of J. L. Austin and John R. Searle. Now, "the starting point of the 
classical theory of speech acts is the following conviction: the minimum unity of human 
communication is neither the phrase nor any other expression. It is the performance of 
some types of acts "(ARMENGAUD, 2006, p. 99). However, in order to look for our 
project of constructing the grammar of the media language, we have to ask ourselves: what 
is the basis of these linguistic performances? What are the parameters of this type of action 
in the language? 
Thus, "the theory of speech acts is a systematic study of the relationship between 
signs and their interpreters. It is about knowing what the interpreters-users do, what acts 
they perform through the use of certain signs "(ARMENGAUD, 2006, p. Austin divides 
into three broad groups of speech acts: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary 
(AUSTIN, 1975, pp. 109-10). However, it is erroneous to think that performative sentences 
are limited to those traditional verbs that Austin spends much of his magnus opus 
analyzing. 
With this, Austin draws the idea of a performative force within language. This force 
would be at the core of any language in full articulation with the propositions that compose 
it. We find here the origin, the mechanism, of the Lyotardian articulation of the language 
game through the difference. 
However, if Austin found such a force along with the leading role of speech acts in 
a pragmatic conception of language, it was Searle who, in fact, fulfilled the idea implicit in 
austinian thought of systematizing these performatives, their strength as their Acts. 
In Speech Acts, Searle defines performative force (or illocutionary force) in the 
form of a function, F (p), "where the variable F stands for the illocutionary force indicating 
devices as values p and p is for expressions for propositions" (Searle 1976 , 31). 
Thus, in addition to corroborating the participation of the illocutionary force as part 
of the meaning (SEARLE & VANDERVEKEN, 2009, p.7), it indicates that in the formula 
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F (p) lies the idea of an illocutionary logic that could be the basis of a Universal grammar, 
as in the sense put by Montague (1970). 
However, although we are quite close to the notion that we have developed 
throughout the present work - that is, grammar is composed of propositions and its rules 
(parergon / language game) and performativity (ergon / That the idea of the Montague 
grammar is applied to the Beweissystem (natural language) and not to the Satzsystem 
(language game). Thus, Searle is thinking here in the languages and not in the linguistic 
protocols, in the languages that language games make most evidente roles. 
In this way, our performative analysis needs to make an adaptation of Searle's 
ideas. Such a task is possible because, as Ranta (2006: 118) states, Wittgenstein conceived 
an individual language game as "a unit that has a set of rules that can be formalized in a 
closed system." 
Ranta posits that this closed system (ie satzsystem) can be schematized as 
beweissystem being, along with Gödel's incompleteness proofs, the two biggest challenges 
against a vertical universality (between subjects) and opening a possibility for a horizontal 
universality (between Languages). 
In stating this, Ranta seeks the possible translation between language games. This 
translation is carried in a usual sense, and therefore different from that posed as a 
possibility by the present work - that is, the horizontal universality between language 
games in its propositional structure indicated by the analytical method of logical play and 
its payoffs. However, this is not a subject for this section. 
Knowing that the satzsystem can be schematized as a beweissystem for 
performativity issues, we must then define parameters for such adaptation. Thus, being 
unable to use only an application of taxonomy and illocutionary logic constructed by 
Searle to verify the illocutionary force of communicational language games, we must be 
inspired by their genesis: the 12 differences that make it possible to classify the different 
types of F in F (p) (Searle, 2002, pp. 2-11). They are: 
 
1. Differences in purpose of (type of) act; 
2. Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world; 
3. Differences in expressed psychological states; 
4. Differences in the force or force with which the illocutionary purpose is 
presented; 
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5. Differences regarding the status or position of the speaker and the listener, 
insofar as this concerns the illocutionary force of the issue; 
6. Differences in how the broadcast relates to the interests of the speaker and the 
listener; 
7. Differences regarding relations with the rest of the discourse; 
8. Differences regarding the propositional content determined by the illocutionary 
force indicators; 
9. Differences between acts that should always be acts of speech and those that can, 
but need not, be performed as acts of speech; 
10. Differences between the acts they require and those that do not require 
extralinguistic institutions for their realization; 
11. Differences between the acts in which the corresponding illocutionary verb has 
a performative use and those in which it does not; 
12. Differences regarding the style of realization of the illocutionary act. 
  
Thus, a discourse genre can only be considered as such if it is in reference to these 
12 dimensions. The non-demarcation of one of them, for example, may cause a field of 
undifferentiation of the ergon and with this, for example, hiding nuances of the linguistic 
action that can be important for a better understanding of a certain language. 
Thus, there is the consideration that if the study of the parergon is a logical study, 
close to the philosophical debates of the Analytical Philosophy and of authors of 
Continental Philosophy that quoted Wittgenstein, the study of ergon is a pragmatic study, 
focused on the speech acts. Logic and Pragmatics do not enter here as competitors, but 
rather as analytical partners in the definition and study of a language. While the first one 
analyzes the clipping modes, the second analyzes the action made possible by its clipping. 
 
References 
ARMENGAUD, F. A Pragmática. São Paulo: Parábola, 2006. 
AUSTIN, J. L. How to do Things with Words. Cambridge: HUP, 1975. 
BAKER, G. P & HACKER, P. M. S. Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning (Part II: 
Exegesis §§1-184). Malden: Blackwell, 2005. 
DERRIDA, J. The Truth in Painting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
ECO, U. Estetica e teoria dell’informazione. Milão: Bompiani, 1972. 
KANT, I. Critique of Judgment. Mineola: Dover, 2005. 
8 
 
LYOTARD, J-F. The Differend. Minneapolis: UMP, 2007. 
MONTAGUE, R. “Universal Grammar”. Theoria.  v. 36, n. 3. Suécia, dezembro/1970. 
RAJAGOPALAN, K. Nova Pragmática. São Paulo: Parábola, 2010. 
RANTA, A. “Type theory and Universal Grammar”. Philosophia Scientiae. CS. 6, Nancy: 
Nancy 2, setembro/2006. 
SEARLE, J. R. Speech Acts. Cambridge: CUP, 1976. 
SEARLE, J. R. Expressão e Significado. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002. 
SEARLE, J. R. & VANDERVEKEN, D. Foundations of illocutionary logic. Cambridge: 
CUP, 2009. 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. Investigações Filosóficas. São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1999. 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. Gramática Filosófica. São Paulo: Loyola, 2003. 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. N. Y.: Harper, 2009. 
 
 
 
